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Abstract 
The multiple objective problem of purchasing for business falls into two broad 
categories: the purchasing of components for manufacturing and the purchasing of 
services. Several supplier selection models have been suggested in the literature for the 
purchasing of production-related components. To our knowledge, no supplier selection 
model for the purchasing of services has been published. In this paper we elaborate on a 
mathematical programming model that selects suppliers of a multiple item service and 
simultaneously determines market shares of the suppliers selected. The methodology is 
based on the collection of Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) information, quantifying all 
the costs associated with the purchasing process throughout the entire value chain of the 
firm. We apply this methodology to the real life case study of selecting airlines for 56 
destinations at Alcatel Bell and have obtained TCO savings of 19.5%. 
ORIMS index: 
1.  decision support systems: airline selection for business travel 
2.  transportation: airline selection for business travel 
• corresponding author. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Fac. E.T.E.W., Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 
Leuven, Belgium. 1.  Introduction and Literature Review 
The  multiple  objective  problem  of purchasing  for  business  falls  into  two  broad 
categories:  the  purchasing  of components  for  manufacturing  and  the  purchasing  of 
services. There are three main differences between the purchasing of professional goods 
and services. Services are intangible and their performance cannot be seen, felt, tasted, 
inspected or touched in  the  same manner as  goods.  Secondly, whereas the  production 
and  consumption  of goods  can  be  separated,  the  production  and  consumption  of a 
service  usually  occurs  simultaneously.  Finally,  components  can  be  stocked,  while 
services have to be delivered at the moment they are needed. Several supplier selection 
models  have been suggested in  the  literature for  the purchasing of production-related 
components. For an  overview of such models we refer to  Weber, Current and Benton 
(1991)  and Degraeve,  Labro  and  Roodhooft  (2000).  To  our knowledge,  no  supplier 
selection model for the purchasing of services has been published. However, in today's 
business environment,  a growing proportion of the  Gross  National Product  (GNP)  is 
accounted for by services. 
The existing literature on the  purchasing of services  can  be subdivided into three 
domains:  general ideas, surveys  on  purchasing practices in  specific environments  and 
in-depth case studies on purchasing practice. 
Firstly,  Schonberger (1980)  defines  a purchasing continuum, from  highly  tangible 
goods such as  simple production components, e.g.  screws, to highly intangible services 
such as c;pnsulting. He suggests that, moving towards intangibility, purchasing contracts 
can  only be  based on  input and  procedural  surrogates  for  quality  rather  than  output 
standards  of  quality.  Sullivan  (1975)  and  Lebell  (1975)  discuss  how  to  negotiate 
contracts for the purchasing of services and they list elements that should be considered. 
Tinsley and Lewis (1978) suggest evaluating industrial services on performance factors, 
input factors,  output assurance factors  and promotion factors,  but  do  not provide any 
assistance  with  how  to  make  these  assessments.  Rosander  (1985)  discusses  quality 
aspects  for  several  services,  including  transportation,  from  the  point of view  of the 
service-providing  firm  which  could  implement  a  quality  control  programme. 
Parasuraman,  Zeithaml  and  Berry  (1988)  develop  a  scale  to  measure  consumer 
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the service in a retailing context, rather than in a business-to-business context. 
Secondly, three surveys  were conducted in  different service procurement situations 
to determine which criteria are used in practice when selecting a supplier for a service. 
Sarkar and Saleh (1974) find that within the context of selecting a consultant engineer, 
several  "competence"  factors  - such  as  knowledge  of  conditions  in  the  buying 
organization,  experience,  quality  of previous  projects  and  references  from  previous 
clients - have to be supported by "personality" factors, such as capable staff and honest 
sales  personnel.  They  also  find  a  discrepancy  between  the  buyer's  and  the  seller's 
perception  of the  relative  importance  of the  selection  criteria.  For  the  purchase  of 
warehouse services, Ferguson (1983) comes up  with selection criteria such as  prompt 
service,  fulfilment  of  special  instructions,  accurate  record  keeping,  reputation  and 
previous experience with the  supplier.  He  also  sheds some light on  how  the different 
members  of the  buying  group  interact  to  select  the  supplier.  Daugherty,  Stank and 
Rogers  (1996)  identify  supplier capabilities  for  helping out in  emergencies,  handling 
change and being flexible as  the most important selection criteria for the broad area of 
logistics services. 
Thirdly, two more in-depth case studies about the purchasing of services were also 
performed.  Zemansky (1979)  discusses  the  governmental  purchasing of services  and 
devotes special attention to  corrupt and illegal  activities  in  this context. West (1997) 
researches  the  key  purchasing  criteria for  advertising  using  in-depth  interviews  and 
finds  reputation, references,  experience, examples  of work,  current clients,  equipment 
and price to be of prime importance. 
We have found  only  two  articles  on  the  purchasing of services  that were  written 
within  a transportation  context.  Cavinato  (1984)  discusses  how  buyers  can  negotiate 
profitable transportation contracts with carriers of goods by paying attention to several 
criteria.  Kleinsorge,  Schary  and  Tanner  (1992)  elaborate  on  the  use  of  Data 
Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA)  for  monitoring  the  relationship  with  a  shipper-carrier 
over time.  However,  they  do  not  provide  any  help  with  selecting  this  supplier of a 
transportation  service,  but  assume  the  relationship  with  one  carrier  to  have  been 
established  earlier.  Both  these  papers  consider  the  transportation  of goods,  not  of 
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suppliers for business travel. 
All  of  these  articles  on  the  purchasing  of  services  are  of  limited  help  to  the 
practitioner  who  has  to  select  a  supplier  for  a  particular  service,  since  they  either 
elaborate on quite broad and vague ideas without proposing a practical solution for the 
problem, or are merely describing current purchasing practice. 
In  this  paper  we  elaborate  on  a  mathematical  programming  model  that  selects 
suppliers of a multiple item service and simultaneously determines the market shares of 
the  suppliers  selected.  The  methodology  is  based on  the  collection  of Total  Cost  of 
Ownership  information,  quantifying  all  the  costs  associated  with  the  purchasing  of 
airline tickets to business destinations. 
The contribution of this paper is  fourfold.  Firstly, to our knowledge, this  is  the first 
model to  have been proposed for selecting the  suppliers of a service and determining 
order quantities to be placed with them and to do it for a real life case study, resulting in 
19.5% savings on TCO. Purchasing management at Alcatel Bell states that the model is 
both  strategically  and  operationally  valuable.  Secondly,  due  to  the  diversity  of 
combinations  of the  various  possible  discount  schemes  offered  by  the  airlines,  it 
becomes  practically  impossible  for  a  human  decision-maker  to  develop  even  a 
reasonably good purchasing strategy, exploiting the opportunities offered.  In  addition, 
the  flexibility  of the  airline  industry that continuously devises  new pricing strategies 
adds to the complexity. We show that the available discount schemes can be considered 
simultaneously,  combined  with  other TCO elements  and  optimized from  the  buyer's 
viewpoint.  Thirdly,  the  operations  research  community  has  researched  the  airline 
business  extensively  from  the  point  of view  of the  airline  itself,  from  a  selling 
perspective  (e.g.  Tilanus,  1997;  Gang,  1998):  scheduling  of  the  flights,  pricing 
strategies, placement of hubs, crew allocation, etc ..  To our knowledge, we  are the first 
to  present  research  that  looks  at  the  airline  business  from  a  customer  perspective, 
making it a novel field of study. Fourthly, we do not adhere to the classical operations 
research  representation  of fixed  and  variable  costs  in  an  objective  function,  but 
introduce  the  Activity  Based  Costing  hierarchy  from  the  management  accounting 
literature, where costs become variable at different levels in the organization. 
4 2.  The Case of Airline Selection at Alcatel Bell 
The service studied at Alcatel Bell, Antwerp, Belgium, is  the selection of airlines to 
cover several destinations. The purchasers in Antwerp decide on all business air travel 
for all Akatel personnel in Belgium, a business of approximately BEF 500,000,000 per 
year (about USD 16,700,000). A choice of 34 different airlines are available, covering 
56  different destinations and departing from Brussels.  Specifically for this case study, 
we consider all the data,  including the savings, over the decision horizon of one  year, 
because airline pricing policies are fixed for this time period. 
In Tables 1,2 and 3 we present the criteria and costs included in our model using an 
illustrative example. For confidentiality reasons, we are not allowed to disclose the real-
life  data.  However,  the  real-life  data  are  used  to  derive  our  conclusions,  which  are 
presented in sections 4 and 5. 
- insert tables 1, 2 & 3 about here -
Purchasing managers are confronted with a complex discounting system, which we 
describe in this section. First, they are able to negotiate with some airlines on charging 
lower prices than  the  IATA (International Air Transport Association) fares  for  some 
destinations; these are known as route deals. An example in Table 3 is KLM offering a 
low price of BEF 15,000 to Zurich. It should be noted that a price on a route deal is not 
always that attractive, since some other airlines might offer a lower price without calling 
it a route deal. 
Secondly, sometimes Alcatel may receive a back-end volume discount if the market 
share  with  an  airline  for  a  specific  destination  exceeds  a  negotiated  percentage.  If 
Alcatel Bell flies with the specific airline on the specific destination for more than this 
percentage of the turnover on this destination for the year,  the company may receive a 
discount  which  may  reach  higher  levels  for  higher market  share percentages.  Those 
market  share  percentages  of  most  companies  with  the  airlines  for  the  various 
destinations become known as they are collected by IA  T  A under the various Billing and 
Settlement Plans (BSP)  and disclosed to  the airlines  on  a monthly basis.  Airlines  that 
offer these discounts depending on market share have contractually agreed with Alcatel 
Bell  that  they  will  provide  them  with  these  BSP  figures.  The  main  reason  for  the 
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which  is  needed when  a flight booked with one  airline is  in  fact  flown  with  another 
airline.  The  example  in  Table  3  indicates  that,  if Alcate1  Bell  flies  to  Austin  with 
Alitalia (AZ) for more than 60% of the total number of flights to Austin in that year, the 
firm will get a 10% back-end discount on the Austin flights from AZ. If they fly more 
than  70%  of the total number of flights to Austin  with this  airline,  they offer a 20% 
discount.  Some  airlines  give  a  discount  on  the  volume  travelled  to  a  destination 
irrespective of the market share with this airline for the destination, such as  Air France 
(AF) to Amsterdam. 
Thirdly,  an  additional  volume  discount  on  business  with  a  specific  airline, 
irrespective  of the  destinations  travelled,  is  often  offered.  Some  airlines  offer  this 
volume discount on the total  volume of Alcatel Bell's business with the airline, while 
others  only  offer this  additional  sales  volume  discount  on  destinations  that  are  not 
subject to front-end route deals, the so-called non-route deal destinations, but do take 
the sales  volume on  these route deal  destinations into account when  determining the 
relevant discounting percentage. If many destinations are considered route deals and the 
discount is only offered on  non-route deals,  a percentage that may at first sight seem 
high might not generate an enormous amount in  monetary terms. Some of the airlines 
state the levels the total sales volume has to reach in order to be eligible for a certain 
discount percentage in absolute terms, while others state them in percentages relative to 
the  total  sales  volume  of Alcatel  Bell,  which  again  becomes  known  from  the  BSP 
figures  collected  by  IATA  The  latter  airlines  give  Alcatel  Bell  the  opportunity  of 
obtaining discounts even if Alcatel's worldwide policy is to cut down the overall level 
of business  travel.  Again,  the  discount percentage offered increases for higher sales 
volumes. In the remainder of the paper we use the term "absolute volume discount" for 
the  former  discount  type  and  "relative  volume  discount"  for  the  latter  type.  For 
example, as  can be seen from  Table  1,  United Airlines (UA) offers  an  absolute total 
sales volume discount of 5%  if Alcatel Bell purchases tickets from  them worth more 
than  BEF 3,000,000  and  offers  10%  if they  buy  more  than  BEF 4,000,000  worth. 
Lufthansa  (LH)  calculates  the  relevant  discounting  percentage  using  the  total  sales 
volume  figure,  but  applies  it  only  to  the  non-route  deal  destinations,  in  this  case 
Amsterdam, Austin and Rio de Janeiro. Consequently, Tables 1 and 3 show that it offers 
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when total turnover exceeds BEF 6,000,000. Sabena (SN) states the discount intervals 
in  terms relative to  the overall business of Alcatel Bell, offering a relative total  sales 
volume discount. Table 1 illustrates that if more than 50% of the total business is flown 
with  SN,  it offers  a 6%  discount,  while if more than  70%  is  reached,  the  firm  will 
receive a 7% discount. KLM offers these discounts only on the non-route deals Austin 
and Bogota, using a relative non-route deal sales volume discount of 10% on the non-
route deal turnover when the total turnover reaches 50% or more of the overall business 
of Alcatel Bell, as  indicated in  Tables  1 and 3.  Observe from these tables that some 
airlines  work  with  a combination  of these  different discounting  environments,  while 
others stick to a single type of discount. 
In  our  Total  Cost  of  Ownership  (TCO)  approach,  we  look  not  only  at  price 
differences  between  the  airlines,  but  also  take  into  account  all  the  costs  that  are 
generated by the airline selection policy in the whole value chain of the purchasing firm. 
We no longer use the traditional fixed and variable cost objective function, but model a 
systems approach incorporating several  levels of costs in  a company-wide objective. 
These costs can be quantified using an Activity Based Costing method that recognizes a 
hierarchy among costs that become variable  at  these different levels. Costs that were 
previously considered to be fixed  can  now  become variable  at  a higher level  in the 
hierarchy  or  in  a  longer,  strategic,  time  period.  Degraeve  and  Roodhooft  (1999) 
distinguish three hierarchic levels of activities into which the parameters of a purchasing 
problem can be subdivided:  (1) the supplier level, (2)  the order level and (3) the unit 
level. Resources consumed by the activities in the three hierarchic levels together equal 
the TCO.  If fewer  activities  are  performed  or fewer resources  are  consumed  by the 
activities,  these  resources  can  be  put  to  an  alternative  use.  In  this  specific  case  of 
purchasing a business travel service, there is no need to recognize order level costs since 
orders and invoices are not grouped and take place every time a ticket has to be booked. 
They do not differ between airlines because ordering is done via a travel agency, whose 
commission  is  included  in  the  price.  To  anticipate  future  changes,  we  include  an 
alliance level in  the model. Most airlines group themselves into alliances in order to  be 
in  a  better position  to  respond  to  competition.  Purchasing  management  expects that 
from  next  year  onwards  some  airlines  will  negotiate  at  alliance  level  and  also  give 
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example in Table 2, purchasing management expects alliances will, as  airlines do now, 
also work with absolute or relative, total or non-route deal sales volume discounts. This 
is  not yet happening for this year's case study but we have prepared the model to deal 
with this situation and all  possible combinations of discounting environments that will 
probably arise in  the very  near future.  For this  specific case, we  thus  recognize three 
hierarchic levels: (1) alliance level, (2) airline level, the supplier of the service, and (3) 
unit level, a return trip to a destination. 
Apart  from  these  all  unit  discounting  schemes,  the  airlines  differ  on  five  other 
criteria. Firstly, the cost of the purchasing manager to manage the relationship with the 
airline  differs  substantially.  This relationship management includes the  preparation of 
the  negotiations,  negotiating  and  follow-up  during  the  year.  Negotiations  with  some 
airlines  take  a  long  time,  while  others  only  require  a  short  time  investment  by  the 
purchasing management. Some airlines require monthly follow-up reports while others 
only  request them  on  a quarterly  basis.  For example,  as  is  indicated  in  Table  1,  the 
purchasing  manager  spends  8  hours  a  year  managing  the  relationship  with  Cathay 
Pacific (CX), at a wage cost of BEF 2,000 per hour. For this year's case study, the cost 
of this purchasing manager is  recognized at airline level, since none of the airlines yet 
negotiates at alliance level. However, we expect that from next year onwards, this cost 
will shift to alliance level for some airlines, as is indicated in Table 2 for alliances All 1  , 
A1l2,  Star and Atlantic.  Secondly,  the  duration of the flights  to  the  same destination 
differs  from  airline to  airline because of other routes,  stopovers or non-direct flights. 
When the flight time is longer than  the shortest possible, these "lost" minutes will be 
weighted by the  gross  wage per minute of the  employees flying for  Alcatel Bell and 
included  in  the  modelling section of the  paper in  the  so-called "additional  unit level 
costs", as opposed to the bare monetary purchasing costs that also apply at unit level. In 
the example in Table 3,  we can see that AZ offers the shortest flight to  Rio de Janeiro, 
whereas if we were to fly with AF to that destination it would take us 40 minutes longer. 
These  figures  are  weighted with  the  average  gross  wages  of BEF 33.33  per minute. 
Thirdly, Akatel Bell places its business travel orders through one travel agency, whose 
profit flows  entirely back to  the  firm,  as  stated in  the  contract.  The  revenues  of the 
agency  are  variable and come from  the  commissions that are  already  included in  the 
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percentage of the ticket price. Overrides are paid by the airlines to the travel agency and 
give  the  latter  an  incentive  to  book  tickets  with  them.  Usually,  these  override 
percentages range from 0 to 9%  and are higher for the airlines with which Alcatel Bell 
has  not negotiated discounts or route deals,  giving Alcatel  Bell  an  incentive to  book 
tickets with these airlines anyway. This is illustrated in  Table  1,  where Delta Airlines 
(DL), with  which no  route deals or discounts are negotiated, offers a high override of 
9%,  whereas  the overrides of the other airlines  range  from 0 to  6%.  The cost of the 
agency is fixed in  annual negotiations and includes a sum to cover all expenses and a 
management  fee.  The  figures  used  in  the  example  are  BEF 500,000  and  20,000 
respectively. This "open book" management fee relationship with the travel agency was 
introduced  in  October  1998,  whereas  beforehand  a  profit-sharing  system  was  in 
operation  under  which  the  agency  received  incentives  to  buy  expensive  tickets. 
Fourthly, airlines have a different number of flights per week to each of the destinations, 
providing reduced or increased flexibility in choosing the appropriate day and time for 
the flight. Finally, not every airline flies to all destinations, for example Table 3 shows 
that UA does not fly to Amsterdam. Criteria two to five are considered at the unit level. 
The airlines do not differ on several other criteria. Firstly, the payment delay offered 
by  all  airlines  is  30 days.  Secondly, ordering and  invoicing costs  are the  same since 
every ticket is booked with the travel agency whenever a trip is necessary, a minimum 
of three  days  in  advance.  The travel  agencies do  all  the  ordering  and  invoicing and 
therefore incur these costs. The revenues of the travel agency consist of a variable and a 
fixed part. The variable part is a commission per return ticket, which is already included 
ex ante in the price data. The grouping of orders would not help Alcatel Bell save on 
ordering  costs,  since  they  still  have  to  pay  the  same  commission  per  return  ticket, 
irrespective of the number of tickets ordered at the same time. The fixed revenues are a 
management fee  and a sum to  cover their costs, which  are  negotiated ex ante for the 
whole year.  Thirdly, since all  airlines invoice in  Belgian francs,  there is  no  exchange 
risk.  Fourthly, the quality  of meals  and  other services is  considered the  same for  all 
airlines when flying under the same level of comfort, i.e. economy vs. business class. 
We have  not  included the  differences  in  punctuality  and  delays  between  airlines, 
although, as  will be shown, these are quite easy to model. It is  very difficult to obtain 
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differences  in  frequent flyer  programmes  (FFPs)  in  our model  because FFP benefits 
only accrue to the traveller and not to the company for which he/she is travelling(2). 
The airline selection model presented in this paper was developed in two phases over 
the course of an  18-month period. In the first phase, which took about 7 months, a pilot 
study involving  18  airlines  and  34  destinations  was  modelled  and  developed.  An  in-
depth comparison of the resulting optimum suggested policy with the purchasing policy 
currently implemented at Alcatel  Bell demonstrated savings of more than  22%  on  the 
yearly budget. Based on  the pilot study,  the purchasing manager for general expenses 
decided that it was  worth the data collection effort and time spent and gave the green 
light for the extension of the case to 34 airlines and 56 destinations. Also, several extra 
features were added to the model following discussions with management. The fact that 
the  19.5%  savings, obtained after the  second phase of the study, were lower than  the 
savings shown in  the pilot study can be attributed to  two  reasons.  Firstly, purchasing 
management had already started developing a policy for some of the destinations in the 
pilot case based on the information from  the pilot study  and in  this  way had already 
achieved  some  of  the  savings  indicated.  Secondly,  the  costs  and  profits  of  the 
relationship with the travel agency were not modelled in the pilot case. 
3.  The Total Cost of Ownership Model 
In  this section, we present the mathematical programming decision model that will 
be used to  determine an  optimum sourcing strategy for business travel at Alcatel Bell. 
This model generates a purchasing policy that minimizes the Total Cost of Ownership 







Before stating the model, we provide a summary of the notation for later reference. 
For the alliances and the airlines: 
: symbol referring to the alliances, 
: symbol referring to the airlines, 
: symbol indicating absolute discounts, 
: symbol indicating relative discounts, 
: index denoting alliances, n=c, or airlines, n=s, 








: index denoting an alliance of a specific discounting type, 
: set of alliances,  n=e,  or airlines,  n=s,  offering total absolute, p=a,  or 
relative, p=r,  sales volume discounts, index i, 
: set of alliances, l1=e,  or airlines, n=s,  offering non-route deal absolute, 
p=a, or relative, p=r, sales volume discounts, index i, 
: set of alliances,  A=T(e,p)uN(c,p),p=a,r, index i, 
: set of airlines,  S = T(s, p) u N(s, p), p=a,r, index i, 
set  of  discount  intervals  for  alliance  and  airline  i,  n=e,s,  p=a,r, 
Vi E T(n, p), Vi E  N(I1, p) index k, 
set  of airlines  in  alliance  I  offering  absolute  or  relative  total  sales 
volume discounts, p=a, r,  index i, 
: set of airlines in  alliance I offering absolute or relative non-foute deal 
sales volume discounts, p=a, r,  index i. 
For the destinations: 
B 
BNEN(c,p) 
: set of destinations to be covered, index j, 
: set  of non-route  deal  destinations  for  the  airlines  that  belong  to  an 
alliance  offering  absolute  or  relative  non-route  deal  sales  volume 
discounts, BNEN(c,p) b  B, p=a,r,  indexj. 
The parameters indicate the data required.  At the first hierarchic level,  the alliance 
level,  the  parameters  describe  costs  incurred  and  conditions  imposed  whenever  the 
purchasing company actually uses the alliance over the decision horizon. 
mahi  :  annual hours of a dedicated purchasing manager for alliance i incurred 
for  the  time  devoted to  managing  and negotiating the  business  travel 
problem, it  i E  A, 
wp  :  gross  hourly  wages  of the  purchasing  manager  who  manages  and 
negotiates business travel, 
ale  : total alliance level costs per year, 
alesi  : alliance level costs for alliance i,  it  i E  A, 
eai  : number of intervals for sales volume discounts, it  i E  A. 
At  the  second  hierarchic  level,  the  airline  level,  the  parameters  describe  costs 
incurred  and  conditions imposed whenever the purchasing company actually uses  the 
airline over the decision horizon. 
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us  : maximum number of suppliers to be used over the time horizon, 
we  : average gross hourly wage of employees flying for Alcatel Bell, 
I1Cj  : number of carriers per destination, 
pa  : profit by travel agency, 
ra  : revenue of travel agency, 
ea  : expenses of travel agency, 
mgf  : management fee for travel agency, 
sIc  : total airline level costs per year, 
sIcs;  : airline level costs for airline i,  'V i E  S, 
msh;  : annual hours of a dedicated purchasing manager for  airline i incurred 
for the time devoted to  managing and  negotiating the business  travel 
problem, 'V i E  S, 
cj;  : number of price intervals for total sales volume discounts,  'V i E  S, 
tu;  : turnover with airline without discounts taken into account,  'V i E  S, 
com;  : commission to  travel agency already included in price of airline ticket 
in percentages,  'V i E  S, 
0;  : override to travel agency from airline in percentages,  'V i E  S. 
At the third hierarchic level, the unit level, the parameters specify costs incurred and 
conditions  imposed  with  respect  to  the  individual  return  tickets  for  a  specific 
destination. At this level, we consider: 
Pij  : price offered by airline i for destinationj, 'Vi E  S,  'Vj E B, 
: estimated annual demand for destinationj in number of return tickets,  'V 
jE B, 
: minimum market share for every airline selected to destination j, 'V j  E 
B, 
sOij  : extra minutes of trip due to other routes, stopovers or non-direct flights 
in comparison to shortest trip possible, 'V i E  S,  'V j E  B, 
n!ij  : number of flights available per week,  'V i E  S,  'V j  E  B, 
mdij  : mean delay when flying with airline ito destinationj, 'V i E  S,  'V j  E  B, 
purc  : total monetary purchase costs per year, 
12 aulc 
ule 
: the additional unit level costs generated per year, 
: total unit level costs per year, 
: number of intervals for destination-specific quantity breaks, \f  i E  S,  \f  j 
ER. 
In the next section, we introduce the parameters necessary for modelling the different 
types of discount. 
For the  total  sales  volume  discounts  with  an  alliance  and  airline  i,  \:fi E T(n, p) , 
n =  e, s; p =  a, r  and for each discount interval k,  \:fk EM  (n)j> we consider: 
It(n,p  );k 
ut(n,p);k 
det(n,p)ik 
: minimum quantity to be bought in the discount interval k in monetary 
terms, 
: maximum quantity to be bought in the discount interval k in monetary 
terms, 
: price discount as a percentage in discount interval k. 
For  the  non-route  deal  sales  volume  discounts  with  an  alliance  and  airline  i, 





minimum  quantity  to  be  bought  buy  in  the  discount  interval  k  in 
monetary terms, 
: maximum quantity to be bought in the discount interval k in monetary 
terms, 
: price discount as a percentage in discount interval k. 
For the discount on specific individual destinations with an airline when exceeding a 
certain market share, we consider \:fiE S,\:fjE R,\:fkE M(S)i: 
lmSijk  :  minimum  market  share  to  be  bought  in  discount  interval  k  in 
percentages per destination, 
:  maximum  market  share  to  be  bought  in  discount  interval  k  in 
percentages per destination, 
: minimum quantity to be bought in discount interval k in monetary terms 
per destination, 
: maximum  quantity  to  be  bought  in  discount  interval  k in  monetary 
terms per destination, 
13 dCijk  : price discount as a percentage in discount interval k per destination. 
The decision variables can also be subdivided into the same three hierarchic levels. 
The alliance level decision variable indicates whether or not the alliance will be used by 
the purchasing company over the planning horizon and is as follows: 
Z(C)i  = I, if we select alliance i, 0, otherwise,  'r/ i E  A. 
The airline level decision variable indicates whether or not the supplier will be used 
by the purchasing company over the planning horizon and is as follows: 
z(  S)i  = 1, if we select airline i, 0, otherwise,  'r/ i E  S. 
The  unit  level  decision  variables  pertain  to  the  number  of return  tickets  for  a 




= number of return tickets to destination j  bought from airline i,  'r/ i  E  S, 
'r/jEB, 
= I, if we fly to destinationj with airline i, 0, otherwise,  'r/ i E  S,  'r/ j  E  B, 
= total  purchases  from  airline  i in  monetary terms,  taking  destination-
specific and airline volume discounts into account,  'r/ i E  S, 
=  total purchases from alliance i in monetary terms, taking destination-
specific, airline volume and alliance volume discounts into account,  'r/ i 
EA. 
Decision variables for the alliances and airlines offering total sales volume discounts 
are as follows,  Vi E T(n, p), Vk E M(n)pn =  C,S; p =  a,r: 
wt(n,p)ik 
xt(n,p)ik 
= I, if we order in total sales volume discount interval k for  alliance or 
airline i, 0, otherwise, 
= total  amount  ordered  in  total  sales  volume  discount  interval  k  for 
alliance or airline i in monetary terms. 
Decision variables for the alliances and airlines offering non-route deal sales volume 
discounts are as follows,  Vi E  N(n, p), Vk EM  (n)i,n = c,s; p = a, r: 
wn(n,phk 
xn(n,p)ik 
=  I, if we order in sales volume discount interval k for alliance or airline 
i, 0, otherwise, 
= total amount ordered in sales volume discount interval k for alliance or 
airline i in monetary terms, 
14 =  total  amount ordered in  sales  volume discount interval  k  to  the non-
route deal destinations for alliance or airline i in monetary terms. 
For alliances and airlines offering relative, p=r, volume discounts,  we also define, 
kr(n,r);k 
lr(n,r)ik 
=  total sales volume, if wtik =  1,0, otherwise, It  i E T(n,r), 
= total sales volume, if wnik = 1, 0, otherwise, It  i E N(n, r). 
Decision  variables  for  the  airlines  offering  destination-specific  discounts  are  as 
follows,  '\fiE S,'\fjE B,'\fkE M(s)j; 
=  1, if we order in destination j specific discount interval k with airline i, 
0, otherwise, 
=  total amount ordered in destination j  specific discount interval k  with 
airline i in monetary terms. 
With the notation given above, the mathematical decision model is described below. 
Objective: minimize the Total Cost of Ownership over the time horizon; 
Min  ale +  sle+ule  (1) 
The objective function (1) is a minimization of the Total Cost of Ownership and reflects 
net  prices  and  resources  consumed  by  the  activities  in  the  three  hierarchic  levels 
distinguished. 
Define the annual alliance level costs; 
ale=  'Lmahj z(e)j wp 
ieA 
(2) 
The alliance level  costs  are  incurred whenever the purchasing company  actually uses 
alliance  i  over  the  planning  horizon,  i.e.  z(e)i  = 1.  The  time  spent  by  a  dedicated 
purchasing manager on  negotiating, managing and following up  the relationship with 
alliance i(??) can be put to some alternative use if alliance i is not chosen, i.e. z(  eY; = O. 
In  this  case,  the  specific  activities  of  these  purchasing  managers  should  not  be 
considered  in  the  purchasing  decision.  The  gross  hourly  wage  of the  purchasing 
manager is multiplied by the number of hours he estimates are consumed in managing 
the relationship with alliance i. If the negotiations are not at alliance level, mahi is equal 
toO. 
Define the annual supplier level costs; 
15 sic:  I,  mshi  * wp *Zi 
ieS 
(3) 
The supplier level costs  are  incurred whenever the purchasing company actually uses 
airline  i over the  planning horizon,  i.e.  Zi  :  1.  Again,  the time  spent by  a dedicated 
purchasing manager on  negotiating, managing and following up  the relationship with 
airline i can be put to some alternative use if supplier i is not chosen, i.e.  Zi  :  O.  If the 
negotiations do not take place at airline level, mshi is equal to O. 
Define the unit level costs over the time horizon; 
ule:  pure +au[e - pa  (4) 
Specifically, the unit level  costs consist of the annual purchase costs  and  the  annual 
"additional" unit level costs minus the annual profit of the travel agency that flows back 
to the purchasing firm. 




The  annual  purchasing  costs  are  equal  to  the  sum  of all  purchases  made  from  the 
alliances,  taking all  discounts  into  account.  We will  discuss  the  modelling  of these 
discounts in a subsequent section of the paper. 
Define the annual additional unit level costs; 
aule: I,  I,  (SO .. +md  .. ~x  .. 
iES  jEB  ')  "60  I) 
(6) 
Additional unit level costs are incurred when flight time is longer than necessary due to 
other routes, stopovers and non-direct flights.  These "lost" minutes are weighted with 
the  average  gross  wage  per minute of the  employees  flying  for  Alcatel  Bell.  As  is 
indicated in  (6), the mathematical formulation  of the model can  easily include delay 
figures but, as  explained earlier, we decided not to take punctuality problems with the 
airlines into account because of the subjectivity of the data. 
Define the annual profit made by the travel agency that flows back to the firm; 
pa :  ra - ea - mgf  (7  a) 
(7b) 
As explained earlier and indicated in (7b), the revenues of the travel agency are variable 
and come from commissions eomi already included in the quoted airline ticket price and 
16 overrides 0; paid by the airlines to the agency as a percentage of ticket price. The cost of 
the travel  agency  is  fixed  in  annual  negotiations  and consists  of a sum  to  cover  all 
expenses and a management fee. 
This concludes the derivation of the  objective function.  The constraints relevant to 
the procurement problem of business travel trips are as follows. 
Satisfy the demand; 
:~>ii=dj  (8) 
ieS 
This constraint (8)  will  determine that the sum of all business trips flown to  a certain 
destination equals the demand for this destination. 
Enforce the limits on the number of suppliers used; 
L  z(s)i?ls  (9a) 
ieS 
LZ(S)i:O;US  (9b) 
ieS 
Z(S)i:O;LXij  (9c) 
JeB 
'<:IiES,'<:I jEB  (9d) 
The conditions (9a) and (9b) force the purchasing plan to contain at least the minimum 
number  Is,  and at  most the maximum number  us,  of airlines  over the  time  horizon. 
Using constraint (9c), the decision variable z(s); will be equal to 0, if the model chooses 
not to  fly with airline i, while constraint (9d)  forces  z(s); to  be equal to  1 if business 
travellers fly with airline i to any of the destinations. 
Impose the minimum number of airlines and their market share per destination; 
LYii?'  nCj  '<:IjE  B  (lOa) 
ieS 
Xii  ?msjdj  Yii  '<:liE  S,'<:IjE B  (lOb) 
Xii  :0; d j Yii  '<:liE  S,'<:IjE B  (lOc) 
Condition (lOa) imposes a minimum number of carriers per destination, which can vary 
across  destinations.  Conditions  (lOb)  and  (JOc)  impose  a minimum market  share for 
each airline flown with to  a destination and, at the same time, enforces proper relations 
between xi) and the binary variable Yi). 
Model the proper relations between the binary variables z( s); and z(  c);, p=a,r; 
17 z(e)i:::;  L,Z(S);  ViE T(e,p)  (lla) 
ieET(c,p), 
z(e);  ~  z(s);  ViE T(e,p),ViE ET(e,p)/  (lIb) 
z(e);:::;  L,z(s);  ViE N(e,p)  (llc) 
ieEN(c,p), 
ViE N(e,p),ViE EN(e,p)/ (lId) 
Conditions  (lla)  and  (llc) force  z(e)i  to  0  if nothing  is  ordered  with  any  of the 
corresponding alliance members. Conditions (l1 b) and (ll  d) imply that z( e); will be 1 if 
any of their airline members is selected by the purchasing firm. 
In  the  following  section we  model  the  different  types  of discounts  offered by  the 
airlines. Expressions (l2a) to  (l2d) model the discount an  airline offers when Alcatel 
Bell flies  more than a specific market share percentage with that airline on a particular 
destination. 
L,xdUk  =Pijxij 
keM(s)/ 
L, Wijk =  z(s); 
keM(.\'\ 
ViE S,VjEB  (l2a) 
ViE S,VjE B,VkEM(s);  (l2b) 
ViE S, VjE B, VkE M(s);  (l2c) 
ViES,VjEB  (l2d) 
Expression  (l2a)  computes  the  total  amount  bought  over  all  discount  intervals. 
Constraints  (l2b) and  (l2c)  impose  the  lower and  upper limits  of the  market share 
discount intervals respectively, ensuring that the binary variable Wijk is equal to 1 in only 
one discount interval.  Constraint  (12d)  ensures that  we cannot obtain  discounts  on  a 
destination  if we  do  not  fly  with  the  airline.  Destination-specific  discounts  offered 
irrespective of the market share which the  airline has  for this destination are included 
here by setting the lower limit of the market share to zero. 
Expressions  (13a)  to  (l3u)  model  the  discounts  offered  by  the  airlines  on  sales 
volume. Expressions (l3a) and (l3b) compute the total purchases per airline taking the 
destination-specific discounts into account, grouping them per airline discounting type, 
for p=a,r. 
L,Xtik = L,  L, (1- deijk )xdijk  ViET(s,p)  (l3a) 
keM(s),  jeBkeM(.\'), 
18 ViE N(s,p)  (l3b) 
keM(.I'\  jeB kEM(s)i 
Compute the total purchases on non-route deal destinations, for p=a,r; 
ViE N(s,p)  (l3c) 
keM(s)i  jEBN£lo.'(C(1)  keM(s)j 
Expression  (13c)  computes  the  total  purchases  on  non-route  deal  destinations  for 
airlines offering absolute and relative non-route deal sales volume discounts. 
Set the limits of the absolute, p=a, sales discount intervals for airlines, n=s; 
xt(n,a)ik ?.It(n,a)ik wt(n,a)ik  ViE T(n,a),VkE M(n)i  (l3d) 
xt(n,a)ik  ~ut(n,a)ik  wt(n,a)ik  ViE T(n,a),VkE M(n)i  (13e) 
xn(n,a)ik ?.In(n,a)ik wn(n,a)ik  ViE N(n,a),VkE M(n)i  (l3f) 
xn(n,a)ik  ~un(n,a)ik  wn(n,a)ik  ViE N(n,a),VkE M(n)i  (13g) 
vn(n,a)ik  ~  un(n,a)ik wn(n,a)ik  ViE N(n,a),VkE M(n)i  (l3h) 
Constraints (l3d) and (13e)  impose lower and upper limits on  the absolute total  sales 
volume discounts, whereas (13f) through (13h) do  the same for the absolute non-route 
deal  sales  volume  discounts.  Notice  in  (l3d)  to  (13g)  that  the  total  sales  volume, 
including the sales volume on route deal destinations, is taken into account to determine 
the valid discount interval. 
Set the limits of the relative, p=r, sales volume discount intervals for airlines, n=s; 
xt(n,r)ik ?.It(n,r)ikwt(n,r)ik2,2,  2,Xdijk 
ie5  jEB kEM(n)i 
xt(n,r)ik  ~ut(n,r)ikwt(n,r)ik2,2,  2,Xdijk 
ie5  jEB keM(n)i 
xn(n,r)ik ?.In(n,r)ik wn(n,r)ik2,2,  2,xdi}k 
ie5  jEB kEM(n\ 
xn(n, r)ik  ~  un(n, r)  ik wn(n, r)ik 2, 2,  2,xdUk 
iE5  jeB keM(n\ 
vn(n,r)ik  ~un(n,r)ik wn(n,r)ikLL  Lxdijk 
ie5  jeB keM(n)i 
ViE T(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (A) 
ViE T(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (B) 
ViE N(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (C) 
ViE N(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (D) 
ViE N(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (E) 
Conditions (A) to  (E)  are non-linear because decision variables directly relating to  Xijk 
are multiplied together. Since we cannot efficiently use constraints (A) to (E)  in  a linear 
integer optimization package, we  introduce conditions to formulate the bounds of the 
relative  discount  intervals  in  a  linear  fashion.  This  is  performed  as  follows.  Define 
19 kr(n,r)'k =wt(n,r)'k  I  I  I  xd  ..  k ,  then  we  need  constraints  that 
I  I  iESjEBkEM(n).  IJ 
.  I 
effectively force  kr(n,r)ik=II  Ixdijk  when  wt(n,r)ik=1  and  kr(n,r\k=O  when 
ie5  jeE kEM (n)i 
wt(n,r)ik= O. This is performed as given below. 
Set the limits of the relative, p=r, sales volume discount intervals for airlines, n=s; 
xt(n,r)ik ~  It(n,r)ikkr(n,r)ik  ViE T(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (l3i) 
xt(n,r)ik $.ut(n,r)ikkr(n,r)ik  ViE T(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (l3j) 
xn(n,r)ik ~  In(n,r)iklr(n,r)ik  ViE N(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (13k) 
xn(n, r)  ik  $. un(n, r)  ik lr(n, r)  ik  ViE N(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (131) 
vn(n,r)ik $.un(n,r)iklr(n,r)ik  ViE N(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (13m) 
kr(n,r)ik $. II  Ixdijk  ViE T(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (13n) 
ieS  jeB keM(n)i 
kr(n,r\k $.Bwt(n,r)ik  ViE T(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (130) 
kr(n,r)ik  ~ II  Ixdijk -B+  B wt(n,r)ik  ViE T(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (13p) 
ieS jeB keM(n)i 
lr(n,r)ik $. II  Ixdijk  ViE N(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (13q) 
ie5  jeN keM(n)i 
lr(n,r)ik $.Bwn(n,r)ik  ViE N(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (13r) 
lr(n,r)ik  ~ II  Ixdijk -B+B wn(n,r)ik  ViE N(n,r),VkE M(n)i  (l3s) 
ie5  jeB keM(n\ 
Constraints  (l3i) and  (13j)  set the  lower and  upper limits  of the  relative  total  sales 
discount intervals. Constraints (13k) to (13n) do the same for the relative non-route deal 
sales discount intervals. If we do not buy in a specific relative total discount interval, i.e. 
wt(n,rh = 0, constraints (13r) and  (13s) force kr(n,r)ik to be zero as  well, where B  is a 
large  number.  If we  buy  in  a  specific  relative  discount  interval,  i.e.  wt(n,r};k  = 1, 
constraints (l3q) and (13s) force kr(n,r);k to  assume the value of the total sales volume. 
Since  the  total  sales  volume  is  also  taken  into  account  in  determining  the  relevant 
discounting interval  constraints for  the  relative  non-route  deal  discounts,  (13q),  (13r) 
and (13s) provide a similar linearization in this discounting environment. 
If we fly  with the airline, we  fly  within a given sales volume discount interval, for 
n=s andp=a,r; 
20 L,wt(n,p)ik =z(n)i 
keM(n)i 
L,  wnik  =  z(n)i 
keM (n\ 
ViE T(n,p)  (13t) 
ViE N(n,p)  (13u) 
In (l4a) and (14b) we compute the total purchases per airline, n=s, also taking the sales 
volume discount into account, for p=a, r; 
xm(n,p)i =  L,(l-dct(n,p)ik)*xt(n,p)ik  ViE T(n,p)  (14a) 
keM(n)i 
xm(n,p)i =  L,(l-dcn(n,p)ik)*vn(n,p)ik + (xn(n,p)ik -vn(n,p)ik) 
kEMCn); 
ViE N(n,p)  (14b) 
Specifically, expression  (14b)  only calculates the discounting percentage on the non-
route deal  destinations for  these airlines  with a non-route  deal  sales  volume discount 
scheme. 
On  top of the destination-specific and sales  volume airline discounts,  the model is 
also prepared to accommodate discounts offered by  alliances. Alliances are expected to 
offer absolute or relative, total or non-route deal destination discounts in  the very near 
future.  Expressions (15a) to  (I5e) model these potential  alliance discount schemes on 
sales  volume.  Expressions  (l5a) and  (I5b) compute the  total  purchases  per alliance, 
grouping them per alliance discounting type, for p=a,r. 
L,xt(C,P)ik =  L,xm(s,p)i  ViE T(c,p)  (I5a) 
keM(c)!  ieET(c,p), 
L,xn(c,p)ik =  L,xm(s,p)i  ViE N(c,p)  (I5b) 
keM(c)j  iEEN(c.p), 
Compute the total purchases to non-route deal destinations, for p=a,r; 
(I5c) 
keM(c),  ieEN(c.p)/ keM(s)j 
Expression  (15c)  computes  the  total  purchases  to  non-route  deal  destinations  for 
alliances offering absolute and relative non-route deal sales volume discounts. 
To  set the limits of the  absolute  sales discount intervals  for  alliances,  expressions 
(l3d) to (I3h) are repeated for n=c and p=a,r. 
When setting the limits of the relative sales volume discount intervals for alliances, a 
non-linear problem similar to that in conditions (A) to (E) is encountered and resolved 
in the model as previously in conditions (I3i) to (13s), this time with n=c and p=a,r. 
21 In  order to  make  sure  that  if we  fly  with  an  alliance,  we  fly  in  a  sales  volume 
discount interval, we repeat expressions (13t) and (l3u) for n=c and p=a,r. 
Subsequently, the total purchases per alliance, also taking the alliance sales volume 
discount into account, are computed as in (14a) and (14b) but now  for n=c andp=a,r. 
The resulting xm(  C,p)i for p=a,r figures are then fitted into expression (5). 
In  order to  conclude the model specification, constraints (16a) to  (16i) impose the 
proper integrity and non-negativity conditions that apply to  the decision variables. For 
all n=c,s andp=a,r: 
z(n)j E  {0,1} 
Yii E{O,I} 
xm(n,p)j ~O 
Xii  ~  0, Xdijk  ~  0, Wjjk  E {O,}} 
wt(n,p)ik E  {O,l},xt(n,p)jk  ~O,kr(n,p)jk ~O 
ViE A,ViE S 
ViE S,VjE B 
(l6a) 
(l6b) 
ViE T(n,p),ViE N(n,p)  (l6c) 
ViE S,VjE B,VkE M(s)j  (l6d) 
ViE T(n,p)  (l6e) 
wn(n,p)jk E {O,I},xn(n,p\k  ~O,vn(n,p)jk ~O,kn(n,p)jk ~O 
ViE N(n,p)  (16f) 
Model (1) - (16f) is a mixed integer linear program that can be solved with specialist 
optimization software such as LINGO (Cunningham and Schrage,  1995) on any IBM-
compatible 486 or higher Pc. The current dimensions of the problem are 56 different 
destinations  which  can  be  reached  on  34  airlines  and  a maximum  of three  times  9 
discount  intervals,  resulting  in  10,204  variables,  of which  4,084  integers,  16,268 
constraints and 44,595 non-users. This model and the scenarios discussed in section 5 
are solved in LINGO version 6.0 on a Pentium II 400 MHz machine with 128 RAM in 
approximately  two  hours  each.  The gap  between  the LP  relaxation  and the  optimal 
integer solution is  slightly less than 3%. An  Excel interface with Object Linking and 
Embedding  (OLE)  technology  allows  data  input  in  a  user-friendly  way.  The  Excel 
output  sheet gives  information  on the TCO,  divided  into  alliance  level  costs,  airline 
level costs and unit level costs. The unit level costs are subdivided into monetary costs, 
longer  trip  costs  and  travel  agency  profit.  For  each  alliance,  airline  and  total  bare 
turnover  without  discounts,  the  discounts  - subdivided  into  alliance  volume,  airline 
volume  and  destination  specific  discounts  - and  the  actual  sum  paid  are  given.  A 
graphical  representation  of this  helps  us  interpret  these figures.  For each  airline  and 
22 volume  discount  type,  it  is  made  clear  which  discounting  interval  is  attained.  An 
indicative number of tickets to  order with the  airline on a destination and the  market 
share of the airlines on the destinations are also reported. 
4.  Results 
In  Tables  4,  5  and  6  we  summarize  the  results  for  the  optimum  policy  of the 
illustrative case to  illustrate some general strategies which also arise from the real-life 
Akatel Bell case,  which  we  are  not  allowed  to  present in  such  detail  for  reasons  of 
confidentiality. 
- insert tables 4, 5 and 6 about here -
The  Total  Cost  of Ownership  of the  optimum policy  for  these imaginary  data  is 
BEF 8,623,084  and  consists  of  BEF 120,000  alliance  level  costs,  these  being  the 
management costs  for the  selected alliances  Alll  and  A1l2,  BEF 16,000  airline  level 
costs, these being the management cost for the selected airline CX and BEF 8,487,084 
unit level costs. The unit level costs consist of BEF 9,206,350 monetary costs paid to 
the  alliances  (Table  6)  and  airlines,  BEF 43,833  longer  trip  costs  and  BEF 763,100 
profit flowing back from the travel agency to the purchasing firm. As indicated in Table 
4,  the  optimum policy proposes  single  or  dual  sourcing for  all  destinations,  making 
complete  use  of  the  available  destination-specific  discounts.  Tables  5  and  6  also 
illustrate that the ideal strategy is  to buy just on or slightly above the lower limit of a 
sales volume discount interval and then spend the additional BEF on another airline to 
reach a higher discount interval for that airline as well. BEF 4,000,000 is spent with CX, 
thus just reaching the lower limit of the discount interval for receiving the 6% total sales 
volume  discount  (Table  5).  Subtracting  the  destination-specific  discount  from  the 
overall turnover with KLM, leaves the purchasing firm with a market share of 50.075% 
with KLM, slightly above the required 50% to entitle it to a 10% sales volume discount 
on  the  non-route deal  destinations  (Table  5).  The  amount  spend  with  ALL2  is  also 
slightly above the BEF 5,000,000 cut-off and results in a 2% total sales volume discount 
(Table 6). 
23 In Table 7 we summarize the results of the optimum policy for the real-life A1cate1 
Bell  case  and  compare  these  to  the  current  policy.  To preserve  confidentiality,  we 
express all figures as percentages of the Total Cost of Ownership of the optimum policy 
and indicate airlines and destinations with numbers. 
-insert table 7 about here-
The optimum airline selection policy narrows down the supplier base from 34 to 9 
airlines  and  proposes  single  sourcing  for  most  of the  destinations.  For  only  one 
destination is the market share split between two airlines. As  we can see from Table 7, 
the Total Cost of Ownership is dominated by the purchasing costs at unit level in this 
case.  Savings  of  19.5%  compared  to  the  current  purchasing  of  airline  tickets  are 
possible.  The  optimum policy  saves  on  the  supplier's  level costs  by  decreasing  the 
number  of airlines,  on  purchasing  costs  by  optimizing  the  total  discounts  and  on 
additional  unit level  costs  by  booking shorter flights.  It makes  optimum  use  of the 
different volume discounts offered by always  buying just above the  lower limit of a 
discount interval. As a percentage of the bare turnover without taking any discounts into 
account, the sales volume discounts amount to 2.584% in the optimum case and 2.534% 
in  the current policy. The savings due to  the optimum use of the destination specific 
discounts are remarkable. Whereas in the current policy these amount to  slightly less 
than 1  % of the bare turnover due to the scattered purchasing policy, they reach almost 
4% in the optimum, mainly single sourcing, case. Alliance level costs are currently non-
existent because all negotiations are still done and discounts are still offered at airline 
level.  However,  the  model  is  ready  to  cope  with  alliance  level  negotiations  and 
discounts that are expected to be offered over the next year for some alliances. 
At present A1cate1 Bell does not operate an airline selection policy. Negotiations take 
place centrally, but tickets are booked on  an  ad  hoc basis by personnel needing them. 
By working in this way, A1catel is not able to make full use of the discounts negotiated. 
Even  if bookings  were  made  centrally,  it  would  be  impossible to  obtain  all  of the 
savings  using  the  simple  Excel  spreadsheets  currently  available  because  of  the 
complicated  discounting  environment.  It is  remarkable  that the  optimum  policy  can 
even save substantially on additional unit level costs, where one would expect personnel 
24 booking tickets ad hoc to look for the shortest possible trip. Purchasing management at 
A1catel  Bell is  currently implementing the model and formulating  an  airline selection 
policy on the basis of its results in order to obtain these savings. In order to be able to 
set up the use of this model during the year, in stead of at the beginning of a new year, 
the tickets bought before the installation of the  model (xunij)  can  be entered and the 
model can then be optimized so as to find the optimum purchasing policy for the rest of 
the year, taking the tickets already bought into account (18). This possibility makes the 
model, as  well as being strategically valuable in developing an airline selection policy 
and an aid to negotiations with the airlines, also operationally usable, since policies can 
be readjusted during the year in  order to accommodate changes in demand, prices or 
discounts. 
"i/iE S,"i/jE B  (18) 
5.  Decision Support for Policy Development and Negotiations 
The model is also able to provide further decision support for the development of the 
business travel policy and negotiations with the different airlines in several ways, as is 
illustrated by the results of the scenarios in Table 8. All cost figures are in percentages 
of the TeO of the optimum solution which is repeated in the second column. 
-insert table 8 about here-
Firstly, it is possible to impose a minimum number of carriers per destination to be 
selected and a market share for each of the chosen airlines, as  is  already discussed in 
expressions  (9a)  and  (9b).  AIcatel  Bell  wants  a  back-up  carrier  for  each  of its 
destinations to ensure reliability of the service, but is not quite sure on which minimum 
market  share  percentage  to  impose  on  this  second  carrier.  We  therefore  ran  two 
scenarios  requiring at  least two  airlines for  each  destination, one  with  a  10%  market 
share and a second one with a 20% market share as a minimum for each carrier. If  we 
did not impose a minimum market share for the second carrier, the model could easily 
pick a solution in which only one ticket was  ordered with the back-up carrier, but this 
would hardly ensure the reliability of the service. The results are in columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 8 respectively. The policy of having a back-up carrier costs A1catel Bell 2.8% in 
25 Teo when imposing a 10% market share and 5.3% when imposing a 20% market share, 
compared to  the  optimum policy  that  selects  a  single  source  for  all  but  one  of the 
destinations. There is an increase in airline level costs because more airlines are selected 
(22  and  24  respectively,  compared  to  9  under  the  optimum  policy),  as  well  as  in 
monetary costs and longer trip costs because, for each destination, a second-best carrier 
is selected for part of the market share. 
Secondly, Alcatel Bells wants  to  choose airlines  with  at  least 14  flights  a week to 
European destinations and 6 flights a week to long-haul destinations, in order to provide 
flexibility in choosing a time schedule. This increases the TeO by 1.6%  compared to 
the optimum policy and changes the airline selection for 16 of the 56 destinations, as  is 
shown in column 5 of Table 8. The increase in TeO is small, but there is a change in the 
airlines  selected for 29% of the destinations. If we combine the latter two and impose 
the  constraints on  the number of flights  per week and the  second carrier with  a  10% 
market share, the TeO increases by about 6.6%, as is indicated in column 6 of Table 8. 
Thirdly, in order to accommodate its business travellers, Alcatel Bell could consider 
not selecting flights that take over one hour longer than the shortest possible trip. This is 
done by adding a constraint to  the  mathematical programming model which excludes 
choices of xij where sOij is greater than sixty minutes. The resulting policy, shown in the 
third column of Table 9, would cost the firm almost 3% extra in TeO and would change 
the  optimum selection  of airlines  for  17  destinations.  A relatively  large reduction  in 
additional unit level cost, which includes the cost of extra minutes of flight, is more than 
compensated by the higher purchasing costs. 
-insert table 9 about here-
Fourthly, an  airline might be excluded. The reasons for this could be assessment of 
the  negotiation  position  of this  airline  or the  filing  of complaints  about  its  catering. 
Management considers not using airline  1 any more.  As  column 4 shows, this policy 
would cost about  4.5%  in  Teo. There  is  a  reduction  in  supplier level  cost because 
airlines for which less negotiation is necessary are selected, but this is more than offset 
by the higher unit level costs, as  is  shown in column 4 of Table 9.  Since airline 1 was 
26 offering the shortest flights to several destinations, many additional hours will have to 
be flown in this scenario, as is indicated by the increase in additional unit level costs. 
Fifthly,  proposals  made  by  airlines  during  negotiations  can  be  valued  instantly. 
Airline  9  could  suggest  that  it  is  ready  to  increase  its  absolute  total  sales  volume 
discounts by 1 percent in each interval. Although this may sound quite attractive, it can 
be  shown (column 5 of Table 9)  using the mathematical programming model that the 
suggestion made by this airline is  not terribly attractive to  A1catel  Bell or to  airline  9 
itself. The TCO will  only decrease by 0.0037% compared to  the optimum policy and 
only for one destination will tickets now be booked with airline 9.  Even in the highly 
unlikely event of airline 9 increasing its sales volume discounting percentages by 6%, it 
will not attract a substantial amount of additional business from Alcatel Bell. The TCO 
would still remain essentially the same (column 6 of Table 9). 
6.  Conclusion 
Although  Total  Cost of Ownership  is  a  widely  accepted  theoretical  concept,  our 
approach  is,  to  the  best  of our knowledge,  the  first  model  that  makes  this  concept 
operational in  a service-purchasing context. The model uses Total Cost of Ownership 
information in an objective mathematical programming model to simultaneously select 
vendors and determine market shares for a multiple item service. In this paper, we have 
modelled the  real-life problem of purchasing business  air travel  within  Alcatel Bell. 
Purchasing managers are faced with  a complicated discounting environment. We were 
able  to  obtain a saving of about  19.5%  on Total cost of Ownership compared to  the 
current ad hoc purchasing policy. 
27 Table I: Airline data fOf  illustrative example 
com- over- managin  airline sales volume discounts 
mission  ride  g hours 
%  % 
total  only on non-foute deal destinations 
absolute  relative  absolute  relative 
LH  9  1.49  ° 
;::: 6,000,000 =} 0.5% 
KLM  7  3  ° 
;:::  50% =} 10% 
AZ  6  2  ° 
;::: 35% =} 3% 
VA  8  I  ° 
;::: 3,000,000 =} 5% 
;::: 4,000,000 =} 10% 
AF  7  °  ° 
;::: 30% =} 0.5% 
SN  7  1  ° 
;::: 50% =} 6% 
;::: 70% =} 7% 
as  7  I  ° 
;::: 28% =} 3% 
DL  7  9  ° 
0% 
ex  9  6  8  ;::: 4,000,000 =} 6% Table 2:  Alliance data for illustrative example 
~ 
members  managin  alliance sales volume discounts 
g hours 
total  only on non-route deal destinations 
absolute  relative  absolute  relative 
ALL!  AF,DL  20  240% => 3% 
ALL2  KLM,AZ  40  > 5,000,000 => 2% 
STAR  LH,UA  30  > 5,000,000 => 3% 
ATLANTIC  SN,OS  20  > 50% => 1% 
CXA  CX  0  0% 
29 Table 3: Airline and destination data for illustrative example  -
Amsterdam  Austin  Bogota  London  Rio de Janeiro  Zurich 
demand  50  40  30  60  15  20 
(tickets) 
price  extra  price  extra  price  extra  price  extra  price  extra  price  extra 
route  flight  flight  route  flight  route  flight  route  flight  route  flight 
deal  mins.  mins.  deal  mins.  deal  mins.  deal  mins.  deal  mins. 
limit  discount  limit  discount  limit  discount 
interval  interval  interval 
LH  20,000  0  280,000  55  150,000  30  6,000R  0  100,000  10  20,000  5 
R  R 
KLM  15,000 R  0  150,000  0  90,000  0  5,000 R  10  120,000  110  15,000  0 
:?70%  20%  R  R 
AZ  13,000 R  15  260,000  0  110,000  20  7,500R  15  110,000  0  17,000  10 
:?60%  10%  R  R 
:?70%  20% 
UA  /  /  278,000  32  132,000  0  8,000  20  95,000  20  16,000  20 
AF  9,000  10  200,000  50  178,000  0  4,500  20  90,000  40  22,000  0 
:?O%  3% 
SN  11,000  10  180,000  15  150,000  30  5,500  0  100,000  30  21,000  13 
:?90%  5% 
as  12,000  5  170,000  15  /  /  6,500  20  110,000  20  19,000  14 
DL  13,000  15  130,000  15  120,000  50  8,000  10  100,000  10  18,000  15 
ex  20,000  0  180,000  10  90,000  0  8,000  20  100,000  15  17,000  0 
R = route deal 
30 ble4: 0  0  _.mum  licv for ill  Ok  d  ket sh  pO---J  --- ------------ - -------T  -- -------- ------ -- ------- - -------
Amsterdam  Austin  Bogota  London  Rio de Janeiro  Zurich 
number  %  number  %  number  %  number  %  number  %  number  % 
of  market  of  market  of  market  of  market  of  market  of  market 
tickets  share  tickets  share  tickets  share  tickets  share  tickets  share  tickets  share 
LH  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
KLM  1  2  40  100  6  20  60  100  0  0  0  0 
AZ  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  i 
UA  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
AF  49  98  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
SN  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
os  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
DL  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
ex  0  0  0  0  24  80  0  0  15  100  20  100 
demand  50  100  40  100  30  100  60  100  15  100  20  100 
31 Table 5: Optimum polic;'yj()r illustrative example: turnover and discounts with airlines 
airlines  total  LH  KLM  AZ  UA  AF  SN  OS  DL  CX 
turnover without discounts  11,296,000  0  6,855,000  0  0  441,000  0  0  0  4,000,000 
destination-specific discounts  1,213,230  0  1,200,000  0  0  13,230  0  0  0  0 
sales volume discounts  774,000  0  534,000  0  0  0  0  0  0  240,000 
paid  9,308,770  0  5,121,000  0  0  427,770  0  0  0  3,760,000 
-----
Table 6:  Optimum policy for illustrative example: turnover and discounts with alliances  -
alliances  total  CXA  ALL2  ATLANTIC  ALLl  STAR 
turnover with airline discounts  9,308,770  3,760,000  5,121,000  0  427,770  0 
alliance volume discounts  102,420  0  102,420  0  0  0 
paid _  9,206,350  3,760,000  5,018,580  0  427,770  0 
------
32 suppliers selected 
Teo 
(as % of TeO optimum 
policy) 
alliance level costs (as % of 
TeO optimum policy) 
supplier level costs (as % of 
TeO optimum policy) 
unit level costs (as  % of 
TeO optimum policy) of 
which: 
monetary costs 
longer trip costs 


















-4.2877 Table 8:  Alcatel Bell Decision Support Scenarios. 
Optimum  Back-up carrier 
Teo 
supplier level cost 
unit level cost of which: 
purchasing cost 
additional unit level cost 
agency profit 
number of destinations with 





































Flexibility & back-up 
carrier with min. 







-3.0404 Table 9: Other Decision Support Scenarios. 
Optimum  Constraint on  Exclude airline  1% higher  6% higher 
extra flight  I  discount  discount 
time  proposal by  proposal by 
airline 9  airline 9 
TCO  100  102.8609  104.4863  99.9963  99.9724 
supplier level cost  0.1790  0.1982  0.1774  0.1642  0.1642 
unit level cost of which:  99.8210  102.6627  104.3089  99.8321  99.8082 
purchasing cost  99.6323  105.6150  101.8701  99.7842  99.7603 
additional unit level cost  2.5841  0.3703  6.3451  2.4517  2.4517 
agency profit  -2.3954  -3.3226  -3.9063  -2.4038  -2.4038 
number of destinations with changing airline  N/A  17  33  3  3 
selection out of 56 
3S 7.  Notes 
(1) Several institutions have an incentive to manage the reported punctuality figures 
because their performances are partially measured on these figures by managers and/or 
clients, i.e. airlines, airports and air traffic controllers. Depending on which institution is 
collecting the data, these will differ substantially. For example, a station manager who 
is responsible for the punctuality of an airline, but also for the insertion of the delay data 
in the computer system, will try to blame air traffic control and the airport as much as 
possible for the delays. In so doing, the station manager is not losing "points" on his 
punctuality record. As a result of this problem with subjective data, we choose not to 
include delay figures in the model. 
(2) Airlines are extremely reluctant to indicate a company as the beneficiary of these 
FFPs. If  we were to introduce FFPs into the model, we also have to consider the cost 
implication because of travellers selecting non-TCO-optimum airlines for specific 
destinations to accrue personal benefits on their FFP cards. However, these costs are 
hard to quantify. 
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